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Abstract
We develop a model to compare leniency programs for cartel be-
havior as enacted, for instance, in the USA and the EU. Although all
such programs are based on the idea that the expected fine ex ante
can be increased by granting fine reductions for self-reporting firms,
they differ considerably in how this basic idea is legally implemented.
Differences include the fine reductions granted for first and second self-
reporters, the role of the amount of evidence provided, and the impact
of whether the case is already under investigation. We elaborate on
the role of asymmetric information to derive the optimal degree of
leniency, and we make use of our findings to compare the programs in
the US and the EU.
JEL-Classification: D62, D82, H50, K42
Keywords: self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, criminal teams, leniency
programs.
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1 Introduction
Legal Situation and Motivation In February 2002, the Commission of
the European Union has substantially revised its law enforcement against
cartels. In particular, the new policy follows the path of the leniency program
enacted in the USA in 1993 and stresses the opportunity of fine reductions
for self-reporting cartel members. A leniency program for cartels and other
illegal teams seems is appealing both from a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. Theoretically, a reduction of the fine for the first self-reporter
and high fines for all other team members induces an incentive to be the
first one who comes forward (often described as ”race to the courtroom” by
legal scholars and closely related to the Prisoner’s Dilemma). Given that all
members are identical, each of them will win the race with probability 1/n,
but will pay a high fine with probability n−1
n
. Hence, reducing the fines for
self-reporting firms can increase the expected fine, and thereby deterrence.
Even though the US program is successful in the sense that it has led to a
tenfold increase in the number or self-reporting cartel members from 1995
to 2000, the European Commission did not adapt the widely accepted US
program but developed a significantly different policy. The most striking
differences between the US and the EU program are summarized in table 1:1
US Program EU Program
(i) The first self-reporting firm
gets full amnesty.
Usually only a partial amnesty
is granted for the first firm.
(ii) The fine reduction (thus) does
not depend on the evidence
provided.
Fine reductions depend on the
evidence provided.
(iii) The second self-reporting firm
gets no fine reduction at all.
Fine reductions also for other
self reporting firms.
(iv) Full immunity can also be
granted if the case is already
under investigation.
Maximum fine reduction of 50
percent if the case is already
under investigation.
Table 1: Distinctive features of the two leniency programs.
1For both programs, leniency rules only apply if some requirements are fulfilled. For
instance, the applying firm must not be the leader or initiator of the cartel. For details
see European Community (2002) and US Department of Justice (2004).
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Inspecting the differences listed in Table 1, the US-program appears much
more radical in implementing a ”winner-take-it-all-approach” - the first self-
reporting firm can get full immunity even if the case is already under inves-
tigation, whereas the second firm is heavily penalized. This approach seems
to have the advantage to set maximum incentives to be the first one who
provides evidence (i.e. inducing maximum tension within the cartel), which
is emphasized by Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement of the An-
titrust Division: ”If you are second, even if only by a matter of a few hours,
which has happened on a number of occasions, the second firm and all of
its culpable executives will be subject to full prosecution” (Hammond 2000,
p.5). Hence, self-reporting incentives for a given crime rate should be higher
in the US program which is in line with a superficial look at the data. In
fact, while the average number of self-reporting cartel members in the US
amounts to 3-4 per month, it turned out to be considerably smaller in the
EU (approximately 1-2 per month).
The EU-program, however, pays more attention to the specific facts of a
case at hand - fine reductions may be granted for all firms, and these fine
reductions depend on the amount of evidence produced, and on whether
the case is already investigated. Thereby, the heterogeneity among cartel
members and the different values of their reports can be taken into account.
This may help to reduce the incentive to violate the law ex ante, and to
enhance the willingness to provide evidence even if one firm has already self-
reported.
Other countries like Japan offer leniency programs similar to the US, while
several EU member states as the Netherlands which enacted a program in
May 2004 follow the approach taken by the EU. The German program can
be interpreted as a mixture of the EU and the US approach because only
the first self-reporter can get fine reductions (as in the US scheme), but full
immunity is not automatically granted which resembles the EU system. In
fact, the EU and US programs can be taken as polar cases of implemented
policy designs. Hence, a careful comparison of the EU and US system will
not only prove useful for a coordination of international cartel prosecution
but also for a harmonization of the competition policy within the EU.
Against this background, the objective of our paper is twofold: First, we
derive the optimal leniency program in a framework that takes important
factors concerning the incentives to violate and to self-report into account.
Second, our results will be used to compare the existing programs in the EU
and in the USA.
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Framework We develop a model that captures the differences of the two
programs described above in the simplest possible way. We assume that there
are only two firms which agree upon collusive behavior whenever their team-
benefit is (weakly) above their aggregated expected fines.2 The following
ingredients are required to distinguish between the two programs:
(a) The two members of the team differ with respect to the degree of evidence
they can provide about their accomplice. This assumption is necessary to
account for part (i) and (ii) of the programs described above.
(b) There are two self-reporting stages: A criminal may self-report before
his case is detected, or after he has been detected, but not yet convicted.
This distinction is important for two reasons: first, it is required to compare
parts (iv) of the two programs. Second, it will turn out that the strategic
interactions between the two criminals differ considerably in the two stages.
While it will turn out that the pre-detection stage can best be described as
a race to the courtroom, the second stage is simply the classical prisoner’s
dilemma.
(c) If the authorities were perfectly informed, then the task of designing an
optimal self-reporting scheme would be trivial. Obviously, the court should
assign the maximum self-reporting fine to the first self-reporter that only
just ensures self-reporting with certainty, and impose the maximum fine to
the other firm(s). This would lead both to a self-reporting frequency of
100 percent and to maximum deterrence. To be realistic (and to analyze
part (iii)), we need to introduce some kind of asymmetric information. In
our model, the probability of being detected does not only depend on the
authority’s investigation effort, but also on team-specific attributes (”types”)
that are private information to the violators. We assume that these types
are learned only after a violation has been committed, and we will refer
to this as ex post asymmetric information. For instance, the team might
learn after the violation that it has acted careless in some sense, or that a
(potential) new market entrant will not be willing to join the cartel. Since
self-reporting occurs only if the type-specific detection probability is known
to be high, the possibility to self-report leads to an option value that ceteris
paribus reduces the expected fine to be paid. This disadvantage of leniency
programs has almost been completely neglected in the economic literature
2Qualitatively, our results would not change if we assumed instead that each member
of the team must weakly benefit from collusion. Implicitly, our assumption allows for side
payments ex ante.
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(see the literature review below) but seems to be important to understand
why a full immunity for the first self-reporting firm may not come without
costs. Furthermore, the two self-reporting opportunities are not based on
the same information set which introduces a non-trivial relation between
pre-detection stage and conviction stage.
Relation to the literature Most fundamentally, our analysis builds on
the self-reporting-literature in the single violator case pioneered by Kaplow
and Shavell (1994). They have shown that, if the sanction for a reported vi-
olation is infinitesimally smaller than the expected fine from being detected,
all violators prefer to self-report. The advantage is that investigation costs
can be saved as only non-reporting individuals need to be examined. Fur-
thermore, an early detection might reduce social costs since countermeasures
can be taken right away (see Innes 1999). Innes (2000) and also Livernois
and Mc Kenna (1999) in a somewhat different context, demonstrate that only
partial self-reporting occurs if violators have different detection probabilities
ex-ante. Feess and Heesen (2002) extend the analysis to ex post asymmetric
information in the sense described above.
An important point to note is that, in the single violator case, self-reporting
always (weakly) decreases deterrence. Hence, leniency can only be optimal
if investigation costs can be saved or if an early detection is socially bene-
ficial. The situation is quite different for criminal teams, because strategic
interactions between the team members in the self-reporting stage can be
used to increase expected fines. Starting with Motta and Polo (MP2003),
there is now a small literature on self-reporting schemes with strategic in-
teraction. MP2003 consider an infinitely repeated collusion game between
firms. In their model, a collusion may break down since partners may cheat
on each other (for instance by setting lower prices than agreed upon). How-
ever, a self-reporting scheme may also lead to more collusion, because low
self-reporting fines provide credible threats to reveal the collusion in case the
partner cheats. MP 2003 show that in the authority’s optimal policy, the for-
mer effect always dominates the latter such that leniency programs (weakly)
improve social welfare. Another result (that turns out to be different to our
findings) is that in the authority’s optimal policy no violator self-reports be-
fore an investigation has been started as violation and self-reporting decision
are based on the same information set.
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (BS 2001) also focus on potential cheating and show
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that moderate fines for single self-reporters may then provide credible threats
to unravel the deal in case the accomplice cheats. However, they also con-
firm the earlier finding by Spagnolo (2000) that collusion can completely be
deterred if the authority subsidizes self-reporters highly enough. This is not
surprising, because high enough subsidies induce full self-reporting even if
the cartel has still some future benefits to expect from their illegal behavior.
In fact, when comparing our paper to MP2003 and to BS 2001 in greater de-
tail in section 4, we will point out that some kind of asymmetric information
is required to understand why subsidies may not be the holy gral and to see
that existing programs do not only differ in a marginal way.
In a preceding paper (Feess and Walzl (2004)), we derive the optimal fine
structure under the assumption that the team members can decide coopera-
tively upon self-reporting by incurring some transaction costs. We then show
that a full amnesty for the first self-reporting firm may not be optimal as
it enhances the incentive for cooperative behavior. While this introduces a
drawback of leniency programs not analyzed in the previous literature, the
contribution clearly suffers from the ad hoc-assumption of transaction costs
which are not endogenously derived in an asymmetric information framework.
Summing up, while there is some literature that justifies leniency programs
in general (but neglects its drawbacks), our paper seems to be the first one
that combines the ingredients (a)-(c) described above in order to compare
existing programs and to draw clear-cut conclusions for policy design.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the
model. Following backwards induction, section 3 analyzes equilibrium strate-
gies (including the authority’s optimal policy). Section 4 discusses merits and
shortcomings of the model and draws conclusions with respect to the existing
leniency programs.
2 The Model
In our model, there are two firms H and L which form a cartel whenever
their team benefit B is above the aggregated expected fine denoted F .3 B
is private information and distributed with continuous density g(B). The
difference between H and L refers to the amount of evidence that can be
provided about the partner if a firm self-reports. Specifically, we assume that
3Hence, we assume that B is sunk. For the significance of this an other assumptions
see section 4.
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if firm H (L) self-reports, than firm L (H) can be convicted with probability
h (l) where h > l. This covers feature (a) as discussed in the introduction.
Types H and L are common knowledge. If none of the team members self-
reports, the case is detected with probability pθ where p ∈ (0, 1) is the
percentage of cases investigated, and θ ∈ (0, 1) is a team specific parameter
distributed with continuous density z(θ). θ is only learned by the team after
the violation decision and is private information (see feature (c)).
If the case is detected, however, the amount of evidence is not necessarily
sufficient to actually convict the team which happens only with probability
t ∈ (0, 1). After detection, violators face a second self-reporting opportunity.
For simplicity, we assume that if a violator self-reports, the authority relies
on the evidence provided and does not engage in further investigation.4 Fur-
thermore, we assume that l > t (as self-reporting would otherwise reduce the
conviction probability which would not make sense) and that both p and t
are exogenously given. 5
The maximum fine the authority can impose is denoted s. Clearly, this fine
has to be paid by those violators who are convicted either due to the accom-
plices report or the governments effort, not convicted violators, however, do
not pay anything. Hence, the authority is left with the assignment of fines
for convicted violators for all types (H,L) and self-reporting opportunities
(before and after detection) depending on wether they have self-reported or
are convicted (both due to the evidence provided by a team member or the
effort spent by the authority). The game considered can now be described
as follows:
• Stage 1 (”Authority’s policy”): Authority commits to a vector R of
(self-reporting) fines (i.e. assigns fines to every final node of the game
tree where a violator is indeed convicted).
• Stage 2 Nature determines and individuals learn their private benefits
B from cartel behavior.
• Stage 3 (”Violation decision”): Individuals decide upon violating the
law (i.e. formation of a criminal team if B ≥ F ).
4Instead, we could define τ as the additional evidence provided by self-reporting, and
then derive l as l = τ + t− tτ > t.
5This has the technical advantage that the authority minimizes social costs simply by
maximizing the expected fine F . It can be shown that our qualitative results carry over
to endogenous monitoring (see Feess and Walzl (2003)).
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• Stage 4 Nature determines and violators learn their team-specific de-
tection probability θ.
• Stage 5 (”Pre-detection stage”): Violators decide separately and non-
cooperatively upon self-reporting.
• Stage 6 Non-reported cases (i.e. teams) are detected with probability
pθ.
• Stage 7 (”Conviction stage”): Detected violators decide separately and
non-cooperatively upon self-reporting.
• Stage 8 Detected, but non-reported cases lead to conviction with prob-
ability t.
In the following, we will derive (the) subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of
the game considered by backwards induction. Thereby, we can restrict at-
tention to stages 1, 3, 5 and 7 as all other stages are either nature’s moves or
part of the authority’s policy committed to in stage 1. With respect to stage
1, recall that the authority’s objective is to reduce the number of criminal
acts given by pi =
∫ B
B˜=F
g(B)dB where B˜ is the borderline type who only
just violates. Hence, the authority only has to maximize expected fines F .
Furthermore, stage 3 is obviously a simple decision problem as both B and F
are known by the potential violators is stage 3. The self-reporting decisions
in stage 5 and 7 result in non-cooperative stage-games between the members
of the criminal team. We will discuss these games in detail in the next sec-
tion. In general, these games will prove to have multiple equilibria (in pure
strategies). As equilibrium selection criterion, we assume throughout that
the team members play the (pure strategy) Nash Equilibrium (NE) that min-
imizes their aggregated expected fines (Kaldor-Hicks dominance). In fact, all
of our conclusions would otherwise be reinforced, because the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion minimizes the deterrence of the self-reporting scheme we propose,
so that the policy will be even more successful when using other equilibrium
selection concepts. Furthermore, we assume without loss of generality that
every individual self-reports in case of indifference.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Conviction stage (stage 7)
We can now start with the self-reporting decision in stage 7 under the as-
sumption that the team has been detected (note that stage 7 will not be
reached if the team has not been detected, or if a member has already self-
reported). As team members are interrogated separately, let us define cki ,
i = H,L; k = 1, 2 as he self-reporting fine in the conviction stage if the cartel
member i self-reports, and if there are k self-reporters (i.e. the fines imposed
on player i explicitly depend on his self-reporting decision and on the action
of his counterpart). The respective normal form game for the members of
the criminal team is depicted in Table 2 (where the first fine refers to the
row-player H):6
ScL N
c
L
ScH c
2
H/c
2
L c
1
H/hs
N cH ls/c
1
L ts/ts
Table 2: Expected fines in the conviction stage
If both self-report, they pay fines c2H and c
2
L, respectively. If only type L(H)
comes forward, he pays c1L(H) and the evidence provided leads to conviction
of the counterpart (and maximum payments of s) with probability h or l,
respectively. If no-one self-reports, the game enters stage 8 and hence ex-
pected fines are ts. When turning to the authority’s optimal policy in stage
1, we will demonstrate that in the SPE, there is a unique NE in stage 7 (the
conviction stage), and we define f ci , i = H,L as the respective expected indi-
vidual fines. No decisions are to be made in stage 6, so that we can directly
proceed to stage 5.
3.2 Pre-detection stage (stage 5)
We can now turn to the self-reporting decision before the team has been
detected. There is an important difference to the situation in the conviction
stage. In the conviction stage, both members of the cartel are already known
6The team member’s actions at this stage are given by Xci with i = H,L and X ∈
{S,N} where X = S if a player self-reports and X = N if he does not come forward
(superscript c denotes the conviction stage).
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and can be interrogated separately. Hence, the authority can impose different
self-reporting fines depending on the accomplice’s behavior, i.e. differentiate
between c1i and c
2
i . In the pre-detection stage, this is not possible, because,
even if both want to self-report, only one can win the race to the courtroom
(see e.g. the comment made by US-official Hammond quoted above). Hence,
team member’s action S now refers to the attempt to self-report. Assuming
that each of them wins the race to the courtroom with equal probability of
0.5, this leads to the expected fine structure shown in Table 3.7
SdL N
d
L
SdH
1
2
(rH + ls) /
1
2
(rL + hs) rH/hs
NdH ls/rL pθf
c
H/pθf
c
L
Table 3: Expected fines in the pre-detection stage
In table 3, ri, i = H,L is the self-reporting fine in the pre-detection stage,
and f ci is the expected fine for detected violators. If only one, H, say, wants
to self-report, he pays fine rH . His accomplice will then be convicted with
probability h and pays in this case the maximum fine s. This explains the
expected outcome in the
(
SdH/N
d
L
)
-action combination, and analogously in
the
(
NdH/S
d
L
)
-action combination. If both want to self-report, each of them
pays his self-reporting fine ri in case he wins. Otherwise, he is convicted by
the partner’s evidence with probability l or h, respectively, which explains
the expected outcome in the
(
SdH/S
d
L
)
-combination. If none of them self-
reports, the team is detected with probability pθ. The game then enters
stage 7, which leads to expected fines of f ci as explained above.
To analyze possible equilibria, first note that
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
is a NE if and only
if ri > pθf
c
i ∀i ∈ {H,L}. Hence, player i deviates from
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
if θ ≥ ri
pfci
.
Depending on ri and on f
c
i (and hence on the authority’s policy), we have
rH
pfcH
≶ rL
pfcL
. To exclude the action-profile
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
as a (potential) NE, it
suffices that θ̂ ≡ min
(
rH
pfcH
, rL
pfcL
)
≤ θ. Throughout the paper we will refer
to the type of player who destroys the (NHd , N
L
d )-NE as the pivotal player -
more formally:
Definition 1. Player i ∈ {H,L} is pivotal for (NHd , NLd ) being a NE if
θ̂ ≡ min
(
rH
pfcH
, rL
pfcL
)
= ri
pfci
.
7The team member’s actions at this stage are given by Xdi with i = H,L and X ∈
{S,N} as defined above (superscript d denotes the (pre-)detection stage).
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Then, we can describe the possible equilibria as follows:
• Case 1: θ < θ̂: Then, (NdH , NdL) is a NE.
• Case 2: rH
pfcH
≤ θ < rL
pfcL
. In this case,
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
is no NE as player H
has an incentive to self-report (SdH) (i.e. H is pivotal in the sense of Def-
inition 1). Then, (SdH , S
d
L) is a NE if
1
2
(rL + hs) ≤ hs or, equivalently,
if rL ≤ hs. Otherwise, (SdH , NdL) is a NE.
• Case 3: rL
pfcL
≤ θ < rH
pfcH
. In this case,
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
is no NE as player L
is pivotal and has an incentive to self-report (SdL). Then, (S
d
H , S
d
L) if
rH ≤ ls. Otherwise, (NdH , SdL) is a NE.
The distinction between cases 1-3 will be used when deriving the authority’s
optimal policy. In stage 4, the violators learn their team-specific component
θ of the detection probability θp. In stage 3, they from a cartel if their joint
benefit B is weakly above their (joint) expected fine F . In stage 2, violators
learn B. Hence, we can directly turn to the authority’s optimal policy.
3.3 The Authority’s Optimal Policy
Fine Structure in the Conviction Stage Since a violation takes place
whenever B ≥ F , the authority maximizes the expected aggregated fine F for
any t and p given assigning the self-reporting schemeR = (rH , rL, c
1
H , c
1
L, c
2
H , c
2
L).
With respect to the fines imposed in stage 7, we get
Lemma 1. (i) In the authority’s optimal policy mini=H,L (c
1
i ) ≤ ts, c2H = ls
and c2L = hs. (ii) When the conviction stage is reached, both violators self-
report with probability one, and the expected individual fines are f cH = ls and
f cL = hs, respectively.
Proof. Recall that we adopt Kaldor-Hicks dominance as equilibrium selection
criterion in case of multiple equilibria. If N c ≡ (N cH , N cL) is implemented as
equilibrium, then the individual fine is f ci (N
c) = ts ∀i ∈ {H,L}. To destroy
the N c-equilibrium, the authority has to set mini=H,L (c
1
i ) ≤ ts. This given,
Sc ≡ ScH/ScL is the unique NE if c2H ≤ ls and c2L ≤ hs hold, so that imposing
c2H = ls and c
2
L = hs is optimal. Aggregated fines are then F
c(Sc) = s(l+h).
If c2H > ls or c
2
L > hs, then the asymmetric decisions S
c
H/N
c
L and S
c
L/N
c
H
become NE, leading to maximum aggregated fines F c(ScH/N
c
L) = hs+ ts and
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F c(ScL/N
c
H) = ls+ ts, respectively (for higher fines, N
c will be played). From
t < l, it follows that F c(·) is maximized if the authority induces self-reporting
by both parties, which allows for maximum fines hs and ls, respectively. ¥
The intuition for Lemma 1 follows immediately from the fact that, in the
conviction stage, the authority can resemble the prisoner’s dilemma by dif-
ferentiating fines according to the accomplice’s behavior. By setting either
c1H or c
1
L (weakly) smaller than ts, it is ensured that N
c ≡ (N cH , N cL) can be
no NE. This given, the authority prefers to implement Sc ≡ (ScH/ScL) as the
unique NE in stage 7, because the fines if only one self-reports need to be
low to destroy N c as a potential NE. And since the maximum fines which
support Sc as a NE are c2H = ls and c
2
L = hs, the Lemma follows.
Fine Structure in the Pre-Detection Stage Determining the optimal
fine structure in the pre-detection stage turns out to be more complicated.
However, the following two insights are helpful: First, we know from the
conviction stage that f cH = ls and f
c
L = hs if the conviction stage is reached
(see Lemma 1). This allows us to re-write Table 3 as
SdL N
d
L
SdH
1
2
(rH + ls) /
1
2
(rL + hs) rH/hs
NdH ls/rL pθls/pθhs
Table 4: Sub-game perfect expected fines in the pre-detection stage.
which will be easier to handle. And second, the only way to eliminate the
Nd ≡ (NdH , NdL) with certainty is to set either rH or rL to zero, as we have
otherwise a θ small enough such that θ < θ̂ = min
(
rH
pfcH
, rL
pfcL
)
. This given,
the authority has to make the following three decisions:
• Decision 1: It has to decide whether player H or player L shall be
pivotal in in destroying the Nd equilibrium. Since we already know
that f cH = ls and f
c
L = hs, it follows that player H will be pivotal if
and only if rH
pls
< rL
phs
which can be simplified as rH
l
< rL
h
.8 Furthermore,
note that this implies that player L is pivotal if rH = rL as l < h as he
faces higher expected fines in case of conviction.
8Note that this simplification was not possible in section 3 because f cH = ls and f
c
L = hs,
which is part of the authority’s optimal policy in stage 1, had to be derived before.
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• Decision 2: Once a pivotal player (i, say) has been chosen, the au-
thority faces the following trade-off: the lower ri, the higher the prob-
ability that the unwarranted non-reporting situation N c is no Nash
Equilibrium. But on the other hand, the lower ri, the lower is ceteris
paribus the expected aggregated fine F in case self-reporting occurs.
This trade-off determines ri.
• Decision 3: The self-reporting fine for the non-pivotal player (j, say)
rj will then determine whether S
d or an asymmetric equilibrium will
be played in case that Nd is no NE.
To solve the problem, let us assume for the moment that player H is pivotal,
i.e. that rH
l
< rL
h
and that θ > θ̂. Then, (SdH , N
d
L) is an NE if and only if
rL > hs, otherwise S
d is a NE. If the authority prefers the Sd-NE, it will
clearly set rL = hs, i.e. the maximum fine that only just supports (S
d
H , S
d
L)
as an equilibrium. Inspecting Table 4 above shows that the aggregated ex-
pected fine in Sd is thus F (Sd) = 1
2
(rH + ls) +
1
2
(rL + hs) =
1
2
(rH + ls) +
1
2
(hs+ hs) = 1
2
(rH + ls) + hs. On the other hand, for any rL > hs, the
aggregated expected fine in the (SdH , N
d
L)-NE is F (S
d
H , N
d
L) = rH + hs (see
again Table 4). Comparing the two outcomes shows that
F (Sd)− F (SdH , NdL) =
1
2
(rH + ls) + hs− (rH + hs) = 1
2
(ls− rH) > 0
where ls − 1
2
rH > 0 follows from the assumption that player H is pivotal.
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Hence, if the authority chooses the fines such that player H is pivotal, either
Sd or Nd, but no equilibria where only one wants to self-report are possible
in the authority’s optimal policy.
Analogously, we can show that F (Sd) − F (NdH , SdL) > 0 so that we can
summarize our results as follows.
Lemma 2. (i) If H is pivotal, then rL = hs. (ii) If L is pivotal, then,
rH = ls. (iii) In Stage 5, the NE for the stage game is given by S
d = (SdH , S
d
L)
if θ > θ̂ and Nd = (NdH , N
d
L) otherwise.
Proof. Part (i). Has been proven above. Part (ii). Proceeds analogously.
Part (iii). Is implied by (i) and (ii). ¥
9From rHpls <
rL
phs together with rL = hs in the (S
d
H , S
L
d )-NE we get rH < ls.
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The reason for Lemma 2 is that the incentive to self-report is higher when the
partner self-reports, because the probability of being convicted then increases
from θph or θpl to h and l, respectively. Hence, implementing Sd instead
of an equilibrium where only one self-reports allows higher fines without
establishing Nd as NE. Hence, we are left with the question which player
will be pivotal in the authority’s optimal policy (i.e. rH
l
< rL
h
or not). Our
findings with respect to this are summarized in
Lemma 3. In the authority’s optimal policy, the high evidence provider H
is pivotal, i.e. rH
l
< rL
h
.
Proof. Assume for the moment that player L were pivotal. Recall that
rH = ls in this case (see Lemma 2). Define r
∗
L as the optimal rL if L
were pivotal, so that the borderline type θ˜L who only just self-reports would
be given by θ˜L =
r∗L
phs
. Taking Lemma 2 into account, it follows that the
aggregated expected fine if L were pivotal would be given by10 (see Table 4)
F ∗L =
(
1
2
(r∗L + hs) + ls
)∫ 1
θ˜L
z(θ)dθ + p (h+ l) s
∫ θ˜L
0
θz(θ)dθ (1)
Now assume that player H is pivotal and assume that the authority sub-
optimally chooses rH such that θ˜H = θ˜L which requires
rH
l
=
r∗L
h
. Then, the
expected aggregated fine amounts analogously to
FH =
(
1
2
(rH + ls) + hs
)∫ 1
θ˜L
z(θ)dθ + p (h+ l) s
∫ θ˜L
0
θz(θ)dθ (2)
where rH =
lr∗L
h
yields
FH =
(
1
2
(
lr∗L
h
+ ls
)
+ hs
)∫ 1
θ˜L
z(θ)dθ + p (h+ l) s
∫ θ˜L
0
θz(θ)dθ. (3)
It follows that
FH − F ∗L =
1
2
∫ 1
θ˜L
z(θ)dθ
(
s (h− l)− r∗L
(
h− l
h
)]
> 0 (4)
10F ∗L (F
∗
H) is the maximum (and hence optimal) aggregated expected fine the authority
can implement if player L (H) is pivotal.
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which always holds as r∗L < hs because
(
SdH , S
d
L
)
would otherwise be no NE.
And by definition of optimality, it follows that F ∗H ≥ FH > F ∗L. ¥
The fact that the high evidence provider H in general gets a substantial fine
reduction and will (hence) be pivotal in the authority’s optimal policy is not
trivial because there are countervailing effects. On the one hand, if H is
pivotal, the equilibrium fine assigned to his counterpart (rL = hs) is higher
than for a pivotal L (which only results in rH = ls). This clearly increases
expected (aggregated) fines. On the other hand, if H is pivotal, the unwar-
ranted Nd-action combination is (ceteris paribus) more often an equilibrium
(as r
hs
< r
ls
), which is obviously a disadvantage. However, as shown in the
proof to Lemma 3, the first effect always dominates. Then, taking the three
Lemmata together, we can summarize the authority’s optimal policy in
Proposition 1. In the authority’s optimal policy, (i) c2H = ls and c
2
L = hs.
(ii) rL = hs. (iii) rH = argmaxrHFH(
.). (iv) rH < ls (if z(1) 6= 0). (v) A
sufficient condition for rH > 0 is that z(θ) satisfies z(0) = 0. (v) A sufficient
condition for rH = 0 is that z
′(θ) ≤ 0.
Proof. Part (i). See Lemma 1. Part (ii). See Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. Part
(iii) The authority chooses rH as to maximize expected fines
FH =
(
1
2
(rH + ls) + hs
)∫ 1
θ˜H
z(θ)dθ + p(h+ l)s
∫ θ˜H
0
θz(θ)dθ
where the optimization program that implicitly defines the optimal rH is
given in the Appendix. Part (iv) Note that rH = ls can never be optimal,
as ∂FH
∂rH
= 0 and ∂
2FH
∂(rH)2
> 0 at rH = ls. Part (iv). A sufficient condition for
rH ∈ (0, 1) is z(0) = 0 as this implies that ∂F∂rH > 0 for rH = 0. Part (v).
A sufficient condition for rH = 0 is z
′(θ) ≤ 0 as this implies that ∂2F
∂(rH)2
> 0
∀rH ∈ (0, ls) which excludes an interior solution. ¥
Part (i), which is already known from Lemma 1 says that if the team is de-
tected without having self-reported, then the fines are equal to the maximum
fine s, weighted with the probability that one can be convicted by the part-
ner’s testimony. Part (ii) expresses that the low evidence provider L pays
the same fine hs if he self-reports already in the pre-detection stage, so that
he does not benefit from self-reporting at all. Conversely, the high evidence
provider H’s fine derived by ∂FH
∂rH
= 0 (see Part (iii)) for early self-reporting is
strictly lower than his fine for a report in the conviction stage where rH < ls
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is ensured by the fact that type H is pivotal. Parts (iv) and (v) of the Propo-
sition refer to the question whether a full amnesty should be granted to the
high evidence provider if he confesses already in the pre-detection stage. As
expressed in the Proposition, this depends on the distribution of the team-
specific detection probability θ. z(0) = 0 ensures that all violators know
that they will be detected with positive probability, so that a full amnesty
cannot be optimal as even positive fines ensure full self-reporting. On the
other hand, a decreasing density (z′(θ) ≤ 0) means that there is a large num-
ber of violators that will only come forward if a full amnesty is granted. In
contrast, full immunity can never be optimal for type L who will pay rL = hs
if he wins the race to the courtroom, and this holds regardless of the density
function z(θ).
Comparative Statics An important point with respect to the leniency
programs in the USA and the EU is how the self-reporting fines depend on
the evidence provided. We summarize our results as follows.
Corollary 1. (i)
dc2H
dh
=
dc2L
dl
= 0. (ii)
dc2H
dl
=
dc2L
dh
= s > 0. (iii) drL
dh
= s > 0.
(iv) drL
dl
= 0 (v)drH
dh
≤ 0. (vi) drH
dl
≥ 0.
proof: see appendix.
In the conviction stage, the equilibrium fines are c2H = ls and c
2
L = hs, so
that the self-reporting fines are independent of the own evidence provided,
but are increasing in the evidence provided by the partner. The reason is that
the fines are chosen such that both types only just self-report, and the own
incentive to self-report is (for t and s given) a monotone increasing function
of the conviction probability if the partner self-reports.
In the pre-detection stage, we have rL = hs, so that the fine for the low-
evidence provider is again independent of his own evidence, and increasing
in the evidence provided by his accomplice. Both results follow intuitively
from the fact that type H is pivotal for the self-reporting decision, so that
type L’s self-reporting fine is independent of whether he reports before or
after the team has been detected.
The fact that type H’s self-reporting fine is decreasing in his evidence pro-
vided (drH
dh
< 0) follows from the fact that his testimony is more valuable if h
is high. The higher h, the higher is type L’s expected fine hs if H self-reports,
which will hence be made more attractive by reducing rH . The higher l, how-
ever, the higher is ceteris paribus type H’s incentive to self-report, because
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his expected fine when the team is detected without having self-reported in-
creases (recall that c2H = ls). Stated differently, if l increases, a higher rH
can be chosen without destroying H’s self-reporting incentive. Hence, the
pivotal type’s fine depends (non-trivially) on the evidence provided by both
types.
4 Discussion
Significance of assumptions In this section, we will first review the plau-
sibility and the significance of our assumptions. Together with our findings,
this will finally enable us to draw some conclusions for the existing leniency
programs.
First, one might question that the detection probability p and the conviction
probability t are exogenously given. In reality, p and t reflect how much effort
is spend in law enforcement, and are hence choice variables. We analyze
endogenous p and t in a working paper (Feess and Walzl (2003)). In the
conviction stage, the result will then be that the authority sets min (c1i ) = 0
in order to ensure full self-reporting even for t→ 0 which follows simply from
the prisoner’s dilemma structure in the conviction stage. In the detection
stage, the optimal p is derived analogously to rH , but this does not lead to
economically interesting insights. Hence, treating p and t exogenous seems
to be justified for ease of exposition.
Second, one might wonder why we introduce ex post asymmetric information
with respect to θ. Of course, some kind of asymmetric information (besides
the benefit B) is necessary to introduce partial self-reporting (i.e. a non-
trivial relation between different self-reporting stages). However, one might
ask why we do not assume that θ is already known ex ante (as assumed
by Innes (1999)) for the single violator case. Modelling ex post asymmetric
information has three advantages: first, it seems realistic that the cartel gets
new (private) information after the collusion has started. Second, knowing
θ ex ante means that the violation decision depends on a vector of private
signals (on B and θ) which drives the analysis more cumbersome, while,
third, ex-ante asymmetric information implies that the team knows right
from the beginning whether it self-reports which neglects the option value of
a leniency program and, as a consequence, biases the analysis.
Third, we restrict the problem of private information to the benefits and to
the detection probability, and do not extend it to the conviction stage by
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introducing an individual component of the conviction probability (like θ in
the pre-detection stage). However, asymmetric information in the second
stage would not alter the result at all, because one could still implement
self-reporting as a dominant action by setting min (c1i ) = 0.
Fourth, we implicitly allow for cooperative behavior in the violation stage
by assuming that only aggregated fines and benefits matter for the viola-
tion decision. Conversely, we assume non-cooperative behavior in the two
self-reporting stages. Non-cooperative behavior in the violation stage would
lead to less offenses, since both individual expected fines would need to be
above the individual benefit. But this would not change the optimal scheme
qualitatively, while the analysis of the violation decision becomes more cum-
bersome. If, on the other hand, all teams behave cooperatively in the self-
reporting stage, then we are back in the single violator case (i.e. we loose
the special appeal of leniency programs to exploit the strategic interaction
between criminals).
Fifth, our first self-reporting stage is characterized as a race to the courtroom,
while the second one is a prisoner’s dilemma. Deterrence could considerably
be increased if the pre-detection stage could also be designed as a prisoner’s
dilemma by assigning low fines for a single self-reporter, but high fines if
both self-report. Self-reporting of both members would then require to de-
fine a time window (of two or three days, say) where self-reporting would
be interpreted as ”simultaneous self-reporting”. Although tempting from a
theoretical viewpoint, legal scholars convinced us that making the fine for
a self-reporter in the pre-detection stage contingent on whether the second
one self reports or not is legally unacceptable and impracticable, while such a
practice is quite common in the conviction stage (i.e. once potential violators
are interrogated separately).
Finally and most importantly, to analyze cartel behavior, a repeated game
seems a natural assumption (see Motta and Polo (MP2003), and Buccirossi
and Spagnolo (BS 2001)). The key aspect of repeated interaction is that the
team has some future benefits if it is not detected, and this reduces the in-
centive to self-report. This aspect could also be modelled in a reduced form
by assuming that B is non-sunk. Then, without ex post asymmetric informa-
tion, the optimal self-reporting fine would be negative (i.e. a self-reporting
firm would be subsidized) to induce full self-reporting. This is exactly what
is concluded in BS 2001. In our model, the optimal fine would still depend
on the degree of evidence provided and on z(θ). Moreover, fines could still
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be positive, but would definitely be lower.11 The reason is that the foregone
benefit creates opportunity costs of self-reporting, so that the incentive to
self-report decreases, and the authority would partially offset this by assign-
ing lower fines. This must be kept in mind when comparing our model to
reality. More specifically, our model does not provide point recommendations
of fine reductions for a given environment but tries to illuminate the com-
parative statics of fine reductions with respect to evidence provision and the
date of report submission (which is exactly where existing programs mostly
differ).
Finally, assuming that B is non-sunk, would have high costs in our model.
The problem is that both the violation decision and the self-reporting de-
cision in the first self-reporting stage would then depend on B, so that the
authority would have to update its initial information after self-reporting has
taken place. This would lead to a signaling game that could hardly be ana-
lyzed in a model with asymmetric information on θ, with two self-reporting
stages and with different degrees of evidence provision. But as these elements
are essential for a comparison of the programs, and because the additional
effects caused by repeated interaction have been pointed out by MP2003
and BS 2001, we follow the mainstream of the self-reporting literature by
assuming that B is sunk.12
Conclusions for the two leniency programs At a very general level, our
analysis has shown that self reporting schemes for criminal teams are much
more promising than those for single violators. Since strategic interactions
between team members can be used to increase expected fines and to reduce
the frequency of violations, leniency is part of the authority’s optimal policy
even without any additional benefit from self-reporting like cost savings or
early countermeasures. Hence, we emphasize that these programs should be
extended to other fields. In Germany, for instance, all attempts to implement
leniency programs for corruption have yet failed according to legal and moral
considerations. Incentive arguments, however, are hardly taken into account.
Let us now get back to the four differences between the corporate leniency
11The fact that optimal fines may still be positive seems to be the important feature of
ex post asymmetric information.
12From a more practical point of view, there is an additional point to note. In reality,
the maximum fine that can be imposed depends on the severity of crime which is not
independent of the expected future benefits from crime. Hence, s would need to be made
endogenous, and contingent on B.
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programs in the USA and in the EU identified in the Introduction.
• Ad (i). In the USA, the first self-reporting firm always gets full im-
munity if some requirements are fulfilled, and if self-reporting occurs
already in the pre-detection stage. In our model, full immunity can
never be optimal for the low evidence provider. For the high evidence
provider, it depends on z(θ), and hence on the case at hand, whether
full amnesty is optimal or not. As a consequence, granting always full
fine reductions is suboptimal. Recall that the only distinctive feature
between the German and EU leniency programs is exactly the leniency
for the second self-reporter. Hence, our model suggests a harmoniza-
tion of EU competition law very much along the lines of the EU system
(as already practiced in the Netherlands). However, as pointed out, a
full immunity becomes more likely to be the optimal solution (for the
high evidence provider) if future benefits from cartel behavior are taken
into account. In other words, treating benefits as sunk leads to a bias
towards the European system in that respect.
• Ad (ii). In the EU-program, it is explicitly stated that fine reduction
increases in the amount of evidence provided. Although this seems
straightforward, our findings are somewhat more subtle. In the convic-
tion stage, both fines do not depend on the own evidence provided, but
only on the probability of being convicted by the partner’s testimony
(this is driven by the prisoner’s dilemma structure of the conviction
stage). This is also true for the low evidence provider L in the pre-
detection stage. For the high evidence provider H, however, we find
indeed that his fine should be decreasing in his own evidence provision.
In any case, we conclude that the fine structure should not be indepen-
dent of the evidence which supports the European solution (i.e. favors
a case-based analysis against a winner-take-all approach).
• Ad (iii). In the model presented, we did not explicitly analyze what
happens with one violator, L say, if the other one (H) has self-reported.
Then, L can be convicted with probability h and pays fine s. Of course,
whenever convicting L with probability h requires some investigation
effort (which is likely to be the case), it would again be optimal to
offer a self-reporting fine of ls to induce self-reporting by the second
team member. This makes the extensive form of the game somewhat
more complicated and has thus only been considered in Feess and Walzl
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(2003). But following the logic of the model, a corner solution where no
fine reduction is granted for a second self-reporter is clearly suboptimal.
• Ad (iv). Finally, full immunity can be granted in the USA also if
the case is already under investigation. According to our model, the
EU-approach where the maximum fine reduction is limited, is more
appealing, since the fines in the conviction stage should be higher than
in the pre-detection stage for the one who provides more evidence. In
contrast to both leniency programs, we find that the fine for the one
who provides less evidence (type L) should be the same in both self-
reporting stages (cL2 = r
L). The reason is that it is unwarranted that
type L wins the race to the courtroom, which explains the high fine
rL = hs.
In sum, our model shows the limits of the winner-take-all approach followed
by the US authority and highlights the impact of heterogeneity among cartel
members with respect to the evidence they can provide about their coun-
terparts on the optimal fine structure. Moreover, we have shown how the
nature of the strategic interaction between members of the criminal team
(i.e. the differences between races to the court room and prisoner’s dilemma
situations) influences the optimal enforcement scheme. Both features seem
to be underdeveloped in the design of existing leniency programs.
Appendix
Optimization Program. With
FH =
(
1
2
(rH + ls) + hs
)∫ 1
θ˜H
z(θ)dθ + p(h+ l)s
∫ θ˜H
0
θz(θ)dθ
it follows that
∂FH
∂rH
=
z(θ˜H)
pls
(
1
2
rH − 1
2
ls+ rH
h
l
− hs
)
+
1
2
∫ 1
θ˜H
z(θ)dθ
∂2FH
∂(rH)2
=
z′(θ˜H)
pls
(
1
2
rH − 1
2
ls+ rH
h
l
− hs
)
+
z(θ˜H)
2pls
Necessary and sufficient conditions for rH ∈ (0, ls) being optimal are ∂FH∂rH = 0
and ∂
2FH
∂r2H
< 0, respectively.
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Proof of Corollary 1. (i)-(iv) obvious. (v) Comparative statics of rH
w.r.t. h and l are given by
drH
di
= −∂
2FH/∂rH∂i
∂2FH/∂r2H
∀i = h, l
where the second order condition requires ∂
2FH
∂r2H
< 0 for every interior solution.
To prove (v) note that
∂2FH
∂rH∂h
=
z(θ˜H)
pls
(rH
l
− s
)
< 0
(recall that rH < ls).
(vi) Note that the first term in
∂2FH
∂rH∂l
= −z
′(θ˜H)rH
(pls)2l
(
1
2
rH − 1
2
ls+ rH
h
l
− hs
)
−z(θ˜H)
pl2s
(
1
2
rH − 1
2
ls+ rH
h
l
− hs
)
+
z(θ˜H)
pls
(
rHh
l2
− s
2
)
+
1
2
z(θ˜H)
rH
pl2s
(5)
can be approximated using the second order condition
(
∂2FH
∂r2H
< 0
)
such that
the sign of Eqn. (5) can be determined by
∂2FH
∂rH∂l
>
z(θ˜H)h
pl2
(1 + p) > 0
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